Mittelman argues the U.S. is a middle power, no longer a global hegemon

The United States is no longer a superpower or global hegemon but a middle power, political economist Mittelman argues in a sweeping commentary that frames American influence as increasingly dependent on coercion rather than consent. Positioning his critique against both Trump-aligned voices who boast of unrivaled U.S.

hegemony and analysts such as Fareed Zakaria who lament its decline, Mittelman says both camps misunderstand what hegemony requires. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci, he defines hegemony as a blend of consent and coercion—one in which consent lowers the need for force.

As coercion predominates, he argues, hegemony dissipates. He characterizes the United States as a semi-democracy and asserts that the “imperial presidency” lacks a credible narrative.

Mittelman traces America’s ascendancy to the post–World War II order, when the United States helped architect institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and later gave rise to the Washington Consensus of deregulation, liberalization and privatization.

In his view, those policies entrenched U.S. interests abroad but also fueled fragmentation and distrust at home. Turning to recent years, he criticizes what he calls decision-making by gut instinct and disregard for legal constraints, citing Donald Trump’s remark that the only limitation is “my own morality.

My own mind.” He writes that the so‑called rules-based order, or “Pax Americana,” was declared dead at the 2026 World Economic Forum, and quotes Canada’s prime minister, Mark Carney, describing a “rupture.” Amid what he describes as preemptive military incursions, tariffs and mass deportations, Mittelman writes that Trump has continued to tout himself and campaign for the Nobel Peace Prize.

He contends the administration is ramping up brute coercion at home, pointing to alleged actions by immigration agents in Minnesota, and argues these measures signal political weakness, not strength. He says rising military budgets are crowding out spending on education, health care, culture and infrastructure.

Citing Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data from 2025, he notes the United States expended nearly $1 trillion on military outlays in 2024—37% of global military spending—and more than the next nine countries combined.

Owing to what he describes as wars on Venezuela and Iran, he writes that costs for munitions, veterans’ care and interest on the debt rose further; Harvard scholar Linda Bilmes, he adds, expects the conflict in Iran to cost U.S. taxpayers more than $1 trillion.

Mittelman places these trends alongside persistent poverty and inequality, citing U.S. census data, and notes that the number of billionaires increased by 50% from 2017 to 2025 while the corporate tax rate fell from 35% to 21%. He argues that coercive diplomacy, trade wars, digital falsehoods and threats have accelerated the collapse of American hegemony, compounded by democratic backsliding.

He cites the U.S. Liberal Democracy Index 2026 as showing the country fell from 20th to 51st among 179 countries in a single year and links that slide to middling rankings on happiness, inequality and trust. In sum, Mittelman maintains that a U.S. order once grounded in consent has given way to coercion at home and abroad, leaving the country not as a hegemon but as a middle power.