India, Turkey revive consultations as old frictions over Pakistan and Kashmir linger
India and Turkey have reopened a high-level channel, holding the 12th round of foreign office consultations earlier this month, four years after the mechanism was put on hold. The talks test whether the two governments can insulate their ties from a familiar spoiler: tensions between India and Pakistan and Ankara’s support for Islamabad on Kashmir.
For decades, the relationship has been unpredictable, with even minor India-Pakistan disagreements derailing progress. As a result, the bilateral merits of the India-Turkey equation are often under-appreciated and confidence-building measures attempted only sporadically.
The central sticking point remains Turkey’s position on Jammu and Kashmir, which aligns with Pakistan’s view. A revival of Cold War-era defence links between Ankara and Islamabad—and Turkey’s unequivocal backing of Pakistan during its recent military conflicts—has underscored that choice.
Turkish defence exports to Pakistan and wider military cooperation have expanded well beyond South Asia. India’s support for Cyprus is frequently described as a reaction to Ankara’s Kashmir stance. Turkey and Greece both lay claim to the island, which was split in 1974 when Turkey invaded the north following a Greece-backed military coup.
Today, a Turkish Cypriot administration governs roughly a third of the north, while Greek Cypriots control the rest. Pakistan has consistently backed Turkey against Greece, at times offering military assistance. In 1983, military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq said Pakistan would be the first to recognise Turkish Cyprus if it declared independence.
At the same time, several Muslim-majority states with strong ties to both Ankara and Islamabad, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran, maintain cordial relations with Cyprus. The Cyprus embassy in Tehran is accredited for Pakistan, and the Pakistani embassy in Beirut is accredited for Cyprus.
India has taken note of this balancing act in the past. In 1984, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal agreed in New Delhi to pause their differences over Kashmir and Cyprus—a milestone seen as stabilising ties.
The subsequent government led by Bülent Ecevit further de-hyphenated relations, shaping a more independent India policy; Ecevit’s translation of Rabindranath Tagore’s Gitanjali is often cited as his enduring cultural link to India. A major reset followed in 2002 under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s conservative-democrat government, which brought new political and economic imperatives.
High-level visits multiplied, business and cultural delegations exchanged frequently, and people-to-people links expanded. Bilateral trade grew from $700 million in 2002 to $13.82 billion in 2022. That trajectory was tested in 2019 when India abrogated Article 370, which had accorded special status to Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan criticised the move and was supported by Turkey. By then, Ankara’s approach to South Asia had begun to resemble a Cold War-era template that prioritised security over trade and the economy.
More recently, according to this account, Erdoğan’s India policy reached its decisive end during a brief India-Pakistan conflict last year following a terror attack in Kashmir’s Pahalgam; Turkey’s condemnation of Operation Sindoor sparked massive backlash in India.
Even so, a June 2022 consultation in Ankara was supposed to secure a breakthrough after years of strain, and the latest round suggests both capitals still see value in engagement. With their roles on the global stage shifting, the two countries retain incentives to explore confidence-building measures and to anchor trade and people-to-people ties against periodic political shocks.